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CAN'T DO THAT, GRANDPA!
EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy Corporation'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, a substantial amount of electric energy is
generated by highly polluting but virtually unregulated coal-burning
electric power plants, especially grandfathered plants built before 1970.
Air pollutants produced by the energy industry threaten public health and
aquatic ecosystems, elevate the acidity level of rainwater, destroy
visibility in national parks and wildlife areas and exacerbate greenhouse
effect. 3 To reduce total pollutants produced by the energy industry,
Congress amended the Clean Air Act ("CAA") in the Seventies so that
power plants could be regulated by emission reduction standards imposed
to control the total amount of emitted pollutants.4 In order to ease the
transition of the industry towards more stringent standards, grandfathered
plants were allowed to emit higher levels of pollutants than modern plants
as long as they would not undertake modifications.
For the past three decades, large energy companies have been
taking advantage of the grandfathering regulations by claiming
grandfathered status but undertaking major improvement projects to
extend grandfathered plants' daily operational hours and normal life spans.
Whether these improvement projects constituted "modifications" under
the CAA became the litigated issue after the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") brought actions against large energy companies in
-

' 127 S.Ct. 1423 (2007).
2 Thomas Gremillion, Comment, Environment
Defense v. Duke Energy
Corporation,Corporation.31 HARV. ENVTL.ENVIL. L. REv. 333 (2007). Grandfathered
plant is a status of power plants created by grandfathering regulations which allow
electric generating units established prior to a specific date to be exempted from new
regulations or subject to less stringent requirements. See Robert N. Stavins, VintageDifferentiatedEnvironmentalRegulation,25 STAN. ENVTL.ENva. L.J. 29 (2006).
Id. at 342-43.
4 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (1970), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Pub. L.
No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
5 Stavins, supra note 2, at 30.
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federal courts in 2000. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review one of the complaints, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy
Corporation, in which the environmental group requested the Court to
interpret the term "modification" as defined in two different parts of the
EPA's regulations. 6 This note will explore the Court's analysis, according
to the Chevron doctrine, leading up to its decision to entrust the power to
the EPA and will comment on its effect upon the serious air pollution
faced by this nation.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Duke Energy Corporation ("Duke"), a private energy company,
had been running eight coal-fired electric generating plants in North and
South Carolina since 1940.7 These plants included thirty coal-fired
generating units that were placed in service between 1940 and 1975.
Between 1988 and 2000, Duke engaged in twenty-nine projects
redesigning and replacing a number of assemblies of its generating units to
extend the lives of these units and allow them to run longer hours each
day. 9 In 2000, the EPA brought this action, intervened by the
Environmental Defense and several other environmental groups,' 0 against
Duke for violation of the CAA for undertaking these projects without
permits as required by the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program
("PSD").1' According to the EPA, the PSD permits had been triggered
because Duke's projects constituted "major modifications" causing net
increases in actual annual emissions.' 2 To calculate net increases in actual
annual emissions, the EPA insisted that the net emissions increase be
determined by an "actual-to-projected-actual" test comparing the actual
pre-project emissions to the projected post-project emissions of the same
Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1423.
Id. at 1430.
United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 2005).
9
Id.
'0 Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1430. Other environmental groups are the North Carolina Sierra
Club, and North Carolina Public Interest Research Group. Citizen Lobby/Education
Fund intervened as plaintiffs and filed a similar claim.
" Duke, 411 F.3d at 544.545.
6
7

12

d
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unit.1 3 In calculating the projected post-project emissions, the extended
daily operating hours resulting from these new projects must be

considered. 14
Duke moved for summary judgment claiming that none of the
projects increased the hourly rate of emissions and could not constitute a
major modification.' Duke argued that a PSD permit would be necessary
only if there was an increase in the hourly rate of emission using an
"actual-to-actual" test.' 6 Under this test, the hours and conditions of
operations before and after the new projects must be held constant when
calculating the post-project emissions.' 7 In other words, PSD permits
would not be necessary even if Duke operated its plants more hours in a
year as long as the hourly emissions rate remained the same as it had been
before the project.' 8 Siding with Duke, the district court granted the
summary judgment holding that the PSD major modification only
occurred when a project increased the hourly rate of emissions. 19 The
court's decision relied on the statutory language of the CAA, the language
of the PSD regulations, and a regulation-explaining letter written by the
Director of the Stationary Source Compliance Division, Edward E.
Reich.20
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, but on a
somewhat different ground.2 1 The court requested sua sponte a
supplemental brief on Rowan v. United States22 and relied on this case to
hold that "modification," a term which was defined in different parts of

14 id

127 S. Ct. at 1430-3 1.
Duke, 411 F.3d at 545; United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp.
2d 619, 640
(M.D.N.C. 2003).
17 U.S. v. Duke, 278 F. Supp.
2dId, at 641.
" Duke, 411 F.3d at 545.
'9Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1431.
20
Duke, 411 F.3d at 545. In his letter, Mr. Reich explained that: "EPA has interpreted this
to mean that for PSD purposes Congress intended the term modification to include all
exemptions included in the NSPS regulations promulgated under Section 111 of the Act
prior to the date of enactment of Section 169." United State. v. Alabama Power Co., 372
F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
21 Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1431.
22 Rowan v. United States, 452
U.S. 247 (1981).
"
16 Duke,
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the CAA, must be interpreted identically because of the "effective
irrebuttable presumption." In response, the EPA argued that the new
issue triggered judicial review that was outside the court's jurisdiction
because the issue involved the validity of the 1980 PSD regulation. 24 The
Supreme Court granted Environmental Defense's petition for certiorari
over the EPA's opposition. 25 The Court vacated the judgment and held
that the EPA was not required to interpret the term "modification"
identically although "modification" appeared in two different parts of the
26
CAA, namely, the PSD and the NSPS provisions. Agreeing that the
Fourth Circuit's analysis attacked the validity of the EPA's regulation, the
Court did not rule on this issue because the Fourth Circuit did not reach
the issue.2 7 The Court allowed Duke to reserve its argument of unfair
notice as a result of the EPA's inconsistent positions and its retroactive
attack on well-accepted practice, the actual-to-actual test.2 8
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Administrative Interpretation
In 1970, Congress passed amendments to the CAA to promote
public health and welfare by protecting the quality of air resources.29 To
achieve this goal the Amendments directed the EPA to develop the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for various
pollutants and required each state to create and implement a plan to meet
the NAAQS. 30 The amendments also required that all new or modified
stationary sources comply with the New Source Performance Standards
23 Duke.

127 S. Ct. at 1431.
Id. The judicial review would implicate section 307(b) of the CAA which only allows
judicial review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia within 60 days of
EPA rulemaking. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1970); see also United States v. Cinergy
Corp., 458 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 2006).
25 See Gremillion, supra note 2, at 338.
26
Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1437.
27
Id. at 1436.
28
2 9 Id. at 1436-37.
See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
3o Id.; see New York v. United States, 413
F.3d 3, 11 (D.C.(Fed. Cir. 2005).
24
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("NSPS"), a technology-based control program which required the use of
modem emission reduction equipment.31 Congress amended the CAA
again in 1977 because the NSPS did not achieve the ambitious goals of the
1970 Amendments. 32 The 1977 Amendments incorporated into the 1970
Amendments the existing regulatory PSD program and revised the NSPS
by requiring a higher standard. 3 Under the PSD, before commencing any
construction projects in new or modified existing stationary sources in
areas that had already achieved the standard, the NAAQS must obtain a
permit from the EPA to prove that the proposed project would not emit
excess pollutants. 34
To determine the scope of the NSPS, in 1970, Congress first
defined modification as "any physical change in, or change in the method
of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air
pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any
air pollutant not previously emitted."3 s Between 1971 and 1973, the EPA's
NSPS regulations defined "modification" in virtually the same words as
Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1430.
1d. at 1429 (quoting R. Belden, Clean Air Act 7 (2001)). 1430.
33
1 d. at 1429.
PSD was initiated by the EPA following a Supreme Court's action in
1973, requiring that the CAA mandate measures to prevent the significant deterioration
of air quality in areas where the NAAQS were being met. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 323, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Prior to 1973, the EPA did not require states to
control new sources of pollution that poses no threat to ambient standards, because
Section 110 of the CAA did not explicitly address "potential deterioration of ambient air
quality" in those areas where ambient pollutant levels were lower than NAAQS. Id. at
346-47.
34
New York, 413 F.3d at 12;. Initially, the PSD program applied to new sources only.
Months later, Congress corrected it by expanding the definition of "construction" under
the PSD provisions to include modified existing sources through "technical and
conforming amendments" to the CAA. Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1293, 1402 (1977).
The 1977 Amendments also required preconstruction review process for new or modified
major sources in areas that failed to meet NAAQS, the nonattainment areas. New York,
413 F.3d at 12. Collectively, the Nonattainment New Source Review Program (NNSR)
and the PSD program were known as New Source Review program (NSR). Idat 12-13.
12.
3 Emily Miller, New York v. United States Environmental Protection Agency: The
United States Court of Appealsfor the District of Columbia CircuitProvides
Clarificationon the EPA's 2002 clean Air Act Ruling, 13 U. BALT. J. ENvTL. L. 101, 102
(2005).
3

32
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the statute.36 In 1974, because of the implementation of the regulatory
PSD program, the EPA introduced the term "emission rate" in its
definition.3 7 The regulation's preamble stated that the definition of
modified source was meant to be the same as the definition used in the
NSPS. 38 In 1975, the EPA amended the NSPS and adopted two different
definitions of "modification." 39 The first definition included "any physical
change in, or change in the method of operation of, an existing facility
which increases the amount of any air pollutant... emitted into the
atmosphere by that facility.AO The same term modification was also
defined as "'any physical or operational change to an existing facility
which results in an increase in the emission rate to the atmosphere of any
[regulated] pollutant,' measured not in tons per year, but in kilograms per
hour.A1

In 1977, when Congress incorporated the regulatory PSD program
into the Amendments, the definition of modification was cross-referenced
to the definition provided in the NSPS. 42 The PSD statutory definition
incorporated not only the NSPS statutory definition of modification, but
also the regulations implementing the NSPS program.4 3 At that time, the
1975 NSPS regulations were still in effect." In 1978, the EPA
promulgated its PSD regulation which defined a new term "major
modification" as "physical change, change in the method of operation of,
or addition to a stationary source which increases the potential emission
rate of any air pollutant regulated under the Act." 4 5 By doing so, the EPA
36

id.

New York, 413 F.3d at 12. "Modification" or "modified source."
means "any physical
change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases
the emission rate of any pollutant for which a national standard has been promulgated."
Id. (quoting 39 Fed.Reg. 42,510, 42,514 (Dec. 5, 1974)).
38
Id. (quoting 39 Fed. Reg. 42,513).
39
Duke, 411 F.3d at 543.
40 40 Fed.Reg. at 58,418 (Dec. 16, 1975),
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(h) (1976)).
41 See 40 Fed. Reg. 58,41958,416, (Dec.
16, 1975) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a)-(b)
(1976)).
42 See generally Gremillion,
supra note 2, at 335.
43 United States v. Alabama Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1283,
1295 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
" New York v. United States, 413 F.3d 3, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005)."
45 Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 43 Fed.Reg.
26,388,26,380,
26,403-04 (June 19, 1978).
3
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limited the PSD permit requirement to major modifications only. The
reason for this limitation could be explained by the ruling of the Unites
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C.
Circuit") in 1979 where the definition of "major emitting facility" was
challenged by industry petitioners.4 6 In its opinion, the District of
Columbia Circuit made a conclusion that Congress intended to regulate
stationary sources based on their sizes because these sources were the
primary pollution sources of the nation's air and were financially capable
of bearing the substantial regulatory cost imposed by the PSD permit
requirement. 47 Disagreeing with the EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that major
emitting facilities should not be regulated based on future "potential" to
emit.48
Because of the court's ruling, the EPA revised its regulation in
1980 defining major modification as any change that would result in a
significant increase in "actual" emissions after netting.4 9 The regulation
further defined actual emissions of a particular date as the average rate in
tons per year actually emitted in a two-year period.5 0 Actual emission was
to be calculated by using "the unit's actual operating hours, production
rates, and types of materials processed, stored, or combusted" during the
particular two-year period. For those emissions units which had not begun
normal operations on that particular date, actual emissions were to "equal
Alabama Power Co., 636 F.2d at 351.
Id.at 352-53.
48 John Manuel Rawicz, Note, OptionsAvailable to Reduce
the Potentialto Emit of a
Stationary Source under Section 112 and Title V of the Clean Air Act, 2 ENvTL. LAw.L.
537, 540 (1996).
49 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,700, 52,735 (Aug. 7, 1980). Netting is part of the EPA's
emissions trading program which "allows the exchange of emission rights both externally
(between firms) and internally (within a single firm)." Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.
Hester, Where Did all The Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading
Program,6 Yale J. ON REG. 109, 113, 118 (1989). "Netting permits an internal trading,
not external trading." Id. at 132 n. 125. It allows a facility to modify an existing emission
source without reaching a "significant net emissions increase," and thus allows the
facility to avoid the costly PSD permit requirement. Justin Savage, Confiscation of
Emission Reduction Credits: The Casefor Compensation under the Taking Clause, 16
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 234 (1997). However, Netting does not allow a facility to avoid
NSPS requirement Id.
50 45 Fed. Reg. 52,735-37 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. 51, 52, 124). .
46
47
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the potential to emit of the unit on that date." 5' Further, "significant"
meant an emission rate that would equal or exceed one or another
enumerated threshold expressed in "tons per year." 52 Finally, for permit
purposes, a mere increase in operation hours of or in the production rate
would not amount to a "modification." 53
In the preamble of the 1992 regulations, the EPA clarified that the
PSD analysis focused on "significant net emissions increases in total
annual emissions resulting from a physical change to the unit," whereas
the NSPS analysis focused on the maximum potential hourly emissions
immediately before and after the change." 5 4 "Emissions increased for
NSPS purposes were determined by changes in the hourly emissions rates
at maximum physical capacity. On the other hand, the [PSD] regulations
examined total emissions to the atmosphere.""
B. The Chevron Doctrine
In our modem administrative state, the legislative branch is
responsible for writing statutes and the judicial branch and executive
branch, in the form of courts and administrative agencies, such as the
EPA, respectively, share responsibility for interpreting them.56 When a
court reviews administrative decisions, the different interpretive voices
produced by these two branches often clash because of institutional
differences in political accountability, functions, roles, and expertise. 7
The problem of inconsistent interpretative voices is further complicated by
inconsistent standards in the choice of interpretations adopted by different
courts. Fortunately, the confusion and inconsistency in federal courts had
52

Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(23)(k))..
3 40 C.F.R.13 § 51.166(b)(2)(iii)(f).
54 57 Fed.Reg. 32,314, 32,316 (July 21, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 51, 52, 60)..
55 Id
s6 See Ellen P. Aprill, Symposium, Theories ofStatutory Interpretation,38 LOy. L.A. L.
REV. 2081 (2005).
Id at 2084.
58 Steven S. Davis, The FederalChevron Doctrine: Once and
Future Law in Missouri?
55 J. Mo. B. 126 (1999). The author points out that some courts assert de novo review
and others apply objective test. Id.
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long been solved in 1984 by the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Counsel.59
Under the Chevron doctrine, a federal court need not defer to
administrative interpretation if Congress has directly spoken to the
specific issue in question. 60 The Court reasoned that when the statute is
clear, "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 6 1 However, if a court
determines that Congress is silent or the statute is ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the court must determine "whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."6 2 The
Chevron ruling is justified on two grounds: first, the power is specifically
delegated to administrative agencies by Congress, second, the recognition
that administrative agencies are more competent than courts because of
political accountability and agencies' expertise intheir area. 63
C. JudicialInterpretation
It was well-settled that "to determine whether a physical change
constitutes a modification for purposes of the NSPS, the EPA must
determine whether the change increases the facility's hourly rate of
emission." 64 However, for purposes of the PSD permit, disputes arose as
to how to determine whether a change increased the facility's actual
emissions under the EPA's 1980 final rule. 65 The industry insisted that the
PSD permit was triggered only when a facility's maximum hourly
emissions rate went up because of a physical or operational change.
According to the EPA, the PSD permit was triggered when a facility's past
59 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
0

Id. at 842-43.

61 Id..

62

Id. at 843.

William Andersen, Chevron in the State: An Assessment and a Proposal,58 ADMIN. L.
REv. 1017, 1017-18 (2006).
64
See Symposium, Is a Rule by Any OtherName Still a Rule? CaseAnswers under the
Clean Air Act, 18 N. KY. L. REv. 271, 279 (1991). The hourly rate is expressed in kg/hr
as opposed to ton/year expressing the annual emissions rate. Id.
65 New York v. United States, 413 F.3d 3, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
66
63

id.
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two-year average annual emissions was less than future annual emissions
expressed in ton/year after netting.67 In short, the battle between the EPA
and the industry was whether the future emissions should have been
calculated by the "actual-to-projected-actual" test or by the "actual-toactual" test. 68
The "actual-to-projected-actual" test on which EPA insisted in
Duke was developed by the Seventh Circuit in Wisconsin Electric Power
Company v. Reilly ("WEPCO").69 In WEPCO, the court held that for PSD
permit purposes mere increase in operation hours or in production rates
did not constitute a physical change or a change in the method of
operation. 70 This "production rate/operation hours" exclusion was to allow
facilities to take advantage of fluctuating market conditions.7 ' The
WEPCO court also held that the "actual-to-potential" test adopted by the
EPA to calculate the plant's post-project emissions was not supported by
existing regulations. 72 Under the actual-to-potential test, the post-project
emissions were calculated assuming the source would operate at its full
capacity in the future.7 3 In WEPCO, the EPA projected the post-project
emissions on the basis of non-stop, continuous operations because
WEPCO had the potential to run 24 hours per day, 365 days per year.7 4
The court concluded that in projecting post-project emissions, the EPA
must consider future operations as the source intended and as it was
normally operated.
The EPA responded to WEPCO's decision by adopting the "actualto-projected-actual" test comparing actual emissions before the change to
the projected actual future emissions.7 6 This test was followed in 2003 by
United States v. Ohio Edison Company.77 In this case, Edison undertook
67 id

68

id.
Wis. Elec. Power Company v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter
WEPCO].
70
Id. at 901 n.11.
71 See 45 Fed.Reg. 52676, 52704 (Aug. 7,
1980).
72 WEPCO, 893 F.2d at 918.
73
Id. at 916.
69

74 id

Id. at 918 (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
New York v. United States, 413 F.3d 3, 16 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
n United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
7

76
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eleven construction projects replacing major components to extend the
lives of units built before 1970. 8 The court rebutted Edison's "actual-toactual" test noting that it would allow utility companies to undertake
modifications without a PSD permit, a position that was expressly rejected
by Congress. 79 The court confirmed that the production rate/operation
hours exclusion was applicable only when there was no physical or
operational change at an electric generating unit.8 0 It rejected the "actualto-actual" test for three reasons: first, it failed to accurately reflect the
obligation imposed by the CAA to project future emissions; second, it
failed to measure emissions in tons per year to determine whether the PSD
compliance was triggered; and finally, a wait-and-see approach to
determine if the post-project actual emissions increased or decreased
conflicted with the legislative intent of pre-construction review." With
respect to Edward Reich's interpretation, the court viewed it as contrary to
the plain language of the CAA and EPA's regulations.
In 2005, relying on Duke,8 2 United States v. Alabama Power
Company took the opposite position of the Edison court holding that the
EPA's interpretation was not entitled to deference under the Chevron
doctrine. 83 The court compared Duke and Edison concluding that Duke's
decision was more persuasive because its analysis was "clearly more
thorough, comprehensive and rigorous." 84
In New York v. U.S.E.P.A., the D.C. Circuit held that there was no
indication that Congress had intended to incorporate the NSPS regulatory
definition of "modification" into the PSD statute. 8586 The court came to
this conclusion relying on the fact that there were two different definitions
of "modification" in the 1975 regulations and Congress did not expressly
indicate one or the other. 87 Therefore, under the Chevron doctrine the EPA
78

id.

79
80

Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.

81Id. at

882.
United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (M.D.N.C.
2003).
83 United States v. Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp.
2d 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
84
Id. at 1305-06.
85 New York v. United States, 413 F.3d
3 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
8
6Id. at 19-20.
87
Id. at 20.
82
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did not unlawfully interpret prior statutory definitions and rules by taking
account of the high level of technical expertise. However, unlike Duke,
the court purposefully avoided to address if Congress intended to interpret
identically across the NSPS and PSD programs. 89
When the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue in U.S. v. Cinergy Co.
in 2006, it affirmed the district court's decision that the net emission rate
was to be calculated based on an annual, rather than an hourly, emission
rate.90 The court first stated that "actual operating hours" was more
naturally read to mean the total number of hours that the plant was in
operation. 9 ' Next, the court noted that Cinergy's interpretation would
discourage replacement of old emitting facilities by allowing the facilities
to undertake physical change to increase output by longer operation hours
each day without taking measures to prevent increased pollution generated
by the enhanced output. 92 The court pointed out that the Duke court
stepped out of bounds because Duke, as well as Cinergy, was not arguing
on the meaning but the validity of EPA's regulations which was beyond a
regional circuit's jurisdiction.93 Finally, the court stated that the same
word could mean different things in different parts of a statute if it was
employed with different intent.94 The NSPS was intended to be an
"inputs" (technical) oriented program, whereas the PSD was an "output"
(pollution) oriented program. 95 Therefore, it was natural to interpret
"modification" under the PSD provisions broadly to "prevent loophole
that would allow pollution to soar unregulated." 9 6

"Id. at 18, 20.
Id. at 20.
90 United States v. Cinergy Co., 384 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006).
" Id. at 708.
92 Id. at
9 Id. at

709.

709-10.
Id. at 710 (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S 427, 433
(1932)).
9
Id at 710-11.
96 Cinergy, 384 F.3d
at 711.
94
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D. FairNotice
In Edison and Cinergy, both courts held that energy companies had
"fair notice" regarding the methodology for calculating emissions
increase.9 7 In Edison, the court concluded that fair notice of precise
computation was not an issue so long as Edison could have predicted that
its projects would result in substantial emissions increase. 98 Agreeing with
Edison's conclusion, the Cinergy court further concluded that the plain
language and most logical reading of the EPA's regulations, that the PSD
permit was triggered by annual emission rate, sufficed to show fair
notice. 99 The court bolstered its ruling by the fact that Cinergy should have
been fairly notified by WEPCO decision and could have sought an
applicability determination from the EPA had it been uncertain about
whether its projects needed PSD permits. 00
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Duke, the Supreme Court held that the EPA was not required to
interpret the term "modification" identically in two different parts of the
CAA, namely, the PSD provisions and the NSPS provisions."o" It began
with a rebuttal of the "effectively irrebuttal presumption" asserted by the
Fourth Circuit, stating that in the same statute a given term, sharing the
same definition, may take on "distinct characters" to serve "distinct
statutory objectives calling for different implementing strategies."' 02
Based on this conclusion, the Court reconciled Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co. 103 and Rowan Cos. v. United States'04 by pointing out that the
inconsistent outcomes were derived from different facts with the same
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 878 (S.D. Ohio 2003); see also
F. Supp. 2d at 905.
Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
9 Cinergy, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
' Id. at 906.
101Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423,, 1437 (2007) (citing
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,U.S., 286 U.S 427, 433 (1932)).
10 2 Id. at 1432-33.
103Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
'0 Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
9

Cinergy, 495
98
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underlying statutory interpretation principle.' 0 5 Being unable to ascertain
the legislative intent of the cross-reference through examination of the text
and history of the technical amendment, the Court concluded that "EPA's
interpretation needed only to fall within the limits of what was reasonable
as set by the CAA's common definition."' 0 6 However, this conclusion was
challenged by the concurring opinion which stated that the EPA was
barred from adopting different interpretations of the term "modification"
because Congress had explicitly linked the PSD's definition of
modification to the NSPS.o 7
To show that the PSD permit requirement for a "major
modification" was not based on an increase in hourly rates of emission,
the Court engaged in a lengthy textual analysis of relevant provisions. It
pointed out that the regulatory definitions of the 1980 PSD regulations
were specified either in terms of "annual rate" or "actual emissions
averaged over time", which "[could] not be squared with a regime under
which 'hourly rate of emissions' is dispositive."' 0 8 The court also refuted
the trial court's interpretation of the production rate/operation hours
exclusion that an increase in the hourly rates of emission was a
prerequisite to a PSD permit.109 According to the Court, the exclusion was
to allow private companies to take advantage of favorable market
conditions by simply adjusting operation hours.11 0 Finally the Court
discredited the EPA official's letter as unpersuasive by referring to a

'0 Id. at 1432-33. In Robinson, the definition of the term "employee" was "consistent
with either current or past employment," the Court held that each section of Title VII
must be examined for further meaning to resolve the issue in question. Robinson, 519
U.S. at 343-44. In Rowan, with respect to the term "wages", the Court held that "the
income tax treatment was the proper one across the board," because of a "congressional
concern of the interest of simplicity and ease of administration." Rowan, 452 U.S. at 247.
106 Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1433-34 (citing New York v. United States, 413
F.3d 3, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).).
'0' Id. at 1437.
08
Id. at 1434. Under 40 CFR §§ 51.166(b)(21)(ii), (23)(i), and (b)(3) the terms
"significant" and "net emissions increase" were specified in annual rate. §
51.166(b)(2 1)(ii) was to provide a measuring formula to determine the total emission of
the actual operation. Id.
'Id. at 1435.
110 Id. (citing the preamble to the 1980 PSD regulations).Amendment.
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memorandum written by Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant EPA
Administrator for Air and Radiation. "
Regarding the Fourth Circuit's implicit challenge on the validity of
the EPA's regulations, the Court agreed that it triggered the judicial
review that could only be obtained during enforcement proceedings in the
D.C. Circuit within sixty days of the EPA rulemaking.112 However, the
Court did not rule on the validity of the EPA's regulations because the
Fourth Circuit did not believe that its analysis triggered validity issues and
did not rule on its effect." 3
V. COMMENT

The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on Environmental Defense v.
Duke Energy Corp. is a victory to the EPA and environmental groups who
have been devoted to protecting the nation's air resources. 114 Duke is a
case of judicial review of administrative decisions, governed by the
Chevron doctrine." 5 Although the Court did not mention the Chevron
doctrine in its opinion, it laid out the scheme for the Fourth Circuit to
follow accordingly. Under the Chevron doctrine, the first step is to
ascertain whether Congress had directly spoken to the specific issue in
question." 6 Applying this rule to Duke, the question was whether
Congress had directly spoken to, for purposes of the PSD permit
requirement, the definition of modification by making a cross-reference to
the section defining the same term for the NSPS purposes. According to
the majority's opinion, neither the text nor the legislative history
suggested that Congress had directly spoken to the issue and a crossreference alone was not an unambiguous congressional code." 7 When a
. Id. at 1436 ("[W]hen 'plans to increase production rate or hours of operation are
inextricably intertwined with the physical changes planned,' they are 'precisely the type
of change in hours or rate o[fj operation that would disturb a prior assessment of a
source's environmental impact and should have to undergo PSD review scrutiny."').
112

d

113 id.
114 United States v. Alabama Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1292 (N.D. Ala. 2005)..
us Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
"Id. at 842-43.
117 Duke, 127 S. Ct.
at 1433.
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court determines that the statute is ambiguous, the Chevron doctrine
requires the court to determine whether the agency's decision is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."" 8 The Duke court pointed out that
the EPA's interpretation deserved deference as long as it was reasonably
permissible within the limits set by the CAA's common definition." 9 In
ascertaining the reasonableness of the PSD regulations, the statutory
interpretation principle was that the EPA was not required to interpret
"modification" identically across the PSD and NSPS programs. In other
words, for purposes of the PSD permit the total emission level was
allowed to be measured in ton/year as long as it was reasonably
permissible by the CAA.
The Chevron doctrine recognizes that administrative agencies are
more competent than courts because of political accountability and their
expertise.120 In Duke, the core problem for which the EPA's expertise was
held politically accountable was to address the serious air pollution caused
by large energy companies. 121 These energy companies were financially
capable of bearing the substantial regulatory cost imposed by the PSD
permit requirement but chose not to do so and wrongfully took advantage
of their grandfathered status. 122 The meaning of "modification" has taken
on such a particular significance simply because grandfathering
regulations in the CAA subject unmodified existing sources, power plants
built before 1970, to less stringent requirements than their modified
counterparts.123 The real and original purpose of these grandfathering
regulations was to ease the transition of the energy industry into the next
generation of power plants.124 Members of Congress had once
optimistically estimated that the transition would have been completed in
five to ten years.125 However, the actual-to-actual test arguably provided a
loophole which was gripped by large energy companies as a free permit to

1

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843..

"9 Duke, 127 S. Ct. at 1433.

William Andersen, Chevron in the State: An Assessment and a Proposal,
58
L. REv. 1017, 1017-18 (2006).
121 Gremillion, supra
note 2, at 333.
122 ld
123 New York v. United States EPA,,
413 F.3d 3, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005)..
124 Gremillion, supra
note 2, at 343.
120
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extend total operation hours of grandfathered plants without investing in
new pollution-abatement technologies that prevent increased pollution
generated by physical and/or operational changes.126 If the actual-to-actual
test was recognized by circuit courts, the PSD permit program would be
successfully twisted by the industry into a program providing "perverse
incentives" to allow grandfathered plants to emit even more pollutants
than without the program. 127 The test would strongly discourage the
replacement of old emitting facilities and delay the energy industry as a
whole from moving toward a modem and cleaner generation.128
Before the Supreme Court handed down its opinion, some
environmentalists worried that if the Court would reach the merits of
Duke's claim, the Court's ruling, regardless of its outcome, would threaten
the integrity of the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit
and the temporal limitations mandated by the CAA.12 9 The serious
consequence would be pervasive litigations as a result of multijurisdictions. Because the Court engaged in a lengthy textual analysis of
the EPA's regulations, it appeared that the Court would reach the merit of
Duke's claim. However, the Court skillfully avoided infringing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit by a narrow holding on a
statutory interpretation principle. The Court did not just stop there; it
informed the Fourth Circuit that its analysis did indeed trigger the form of
judicial review only available in the D.C. Circuit which must be done
within sixty days of the EPA's rulemaking. 130 Therefore, on remand the
Fourth Circuit is bound by section 307(b) of the CAA and, should the
Fourth Circuit insist on pursuing the same route, it does not have the
jurisdiction to rule on the issue. In other words, the D.C. Circuit will no
longer be available to Duke or other energy companies even if the circuit
courts hold the EPA's regulations invalid.
The fair notice claim argued by Duke is unlikely to stand. Among
all of the reasons provided by the circuit courts in their opinions, the
strongest one is the nature of the pre-construction review required by the
126 id
127

d

United States v. Cinergy Corp., 458 F.3d705, 709 (7th Cir. 2006).
129 Gremillion, supra note
2, at 333.
130 Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.,,
127 S. Ct. 1423, 1436 (2007).
128
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PSD program. As long as Duke had known about the pre-construction
review and, although it had been uncertain about the regulation, it had the
good faith intent to comply, it could have always sought an applicability
determination from the EPA.13 '
By holding that the EPA was not required to interpret the term
"modification" identically in two different parts of the CAA, the Supreme
Court entrusted the power to the EPA to interpret the term "modification"
as the EPA saw fit to battle serious air pollution generated by
grandfathered power plants. When the term "modification" can be
interpreted differently to provide the functions essential to the NSPS
program and the PSD program, the highly polluting grandfathered plants
will then be regulated under the dual systems as Congress originally
designed in the Seventies. Only under the interplay of the NSPS and the
PSD, the grandfathered plants will be replaced with modem facilities and
the power industry as a whole will be moving towards a modem and
cleaner generation.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Duke is a victory
to the EPA and environmental groups who have been battling with serious
air pollution caused by highly polluted but virtually unregulated coal
burning electric power plants for over three decades. By holding that the
EPA is not required to interpret the term "modification" in different parts
of the CAA identically, the Supreme Court entrusted the power to EPA to
interpret the term as the agency saw fit to achieve the goals set by
Congress when enacting the Amendments to the CAA in the seventies.
When "modification" can be interpreted differently to serve the desired
functions of the NSPS program and the PSD program, the EPA will be
better equipped to deal with the serious air pollution caused by the
grandfathered power plants. By maintaining the integrity of the exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, the Court's ruling
encourages the energy industry to move on from grandfathered status
towards a modem and cleaner new generation.
Hannah Tien
13m

Cinergy, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
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